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Abstract: The	   imperative	  should	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  a	   comparative	  concept,	  defined	  as	  a	  sentence	  type	  whose	  only	  prototypical	  function	  is	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  directive	   speech	   acts.	   Furthermore,	   for	   a	   non-­‐second-­‐person	   form	   to	   count	   as	   an	  imperative	  it	  must	  be	  homogenous	  with	  the	  second-­‐person	  form,	  thereby	  allowing	  true	  imperative	  paradigms	  to	  be	  distinguished	  from	  those	  that	  recruit	  alternative	  structures.	  This	   definition	   of	   the	   imperative	   sentence	   type	   allows	   more	   accurate	   crosslinguistic	  analysis	   of	   imperative	   paradigms,	   and	   provides	   principled	   grounds	   for	   distinguishing	  between	  imperative	  and	  so-­‐called	   ‘hortative’	  and	  ‘jussive’	  forms.	  It	  also	  helps	  to	  clarify	  the	  irrealis	  —	  or	  better	  —	  potential	  status	  of	  imperatives,	  and	  suggests	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  crosslinguistic	  variability	  in	  the	  non-­‐directive	  occurrence	  of	  imperatives	  in	  good	  wishes.	  
 
Keywords: imperative, subjunctive, irrealis, horative, sentence-type, directive speech acts, 
potentiality 
 
1  Introduction 
In their introduction to a major typological volume on imperatives, Birjulin and Xrakovski 
(2001) define imperative sentences as semantically conveying the idea that the speaker 
informs the hearer that he wishes some action (by a certain agent) to be caused by this very 
information. Such definitions, which build the imperative’s directive function into its 
semantic core, are not rare (e.g., Hamblin 1987; Barker 2004; Han 2000; for a discussion, see 
Jary and Kissine 2014: Ch. 4). Now, it is obvious that not all directive speech acts are cast in 
the imperative. In an appropriate context the declarative in (1), for instance, would make for a 
perfectly felicitous order that the addressee leave for London the day after. 
(1) Tomorrow you are going to London. 
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Note also that examples like (1) cannot be dismissed as non-literal or indirect (Recanati 
1987 : 167; Jary 2010 : 72–73; Kissine 2013 : 111–122). Consider the sarcastic (2) or the 
indirect (3) speech acts performed with the intent to convey that the addressee should leave 
for London; in comparison, (1) seems both quite literal and direct. 
(2) [Said in a sarcastic tone of voice:] Of course, tomorrow you can stay here and have a 
lovely day off.  
(3) London is a lovely city, you know. 
Of cases like (1), Birjulin and Xrakovski (2001: 8) say that these sentences are semantically 
imperative but ‘have the grammatical marking of narrative units’. On most of the current 
understandings of the semantic-pragmatic interface, however, it would be more plausible to 
say that (1) is a non-imperative sentence, used as a directive speech act. Importantly, this 
presupposes that imperative sentences are not exclusively defined in terms of directive force. 
That is, one needs clear criteria to decide whether a sentence type, independently of the 
illocutionary function of one of its tokens, is imperative or not. Surprisingly, a satisfying 
definition of this kind is difficult to find in the literature.1 Many authors rely on an intuitive 
delimitation of the relevant morphosyntactic class; and some simply take for granted the 
existence of the imperative sentence-type in their attempts to reduce the imperative to a 
declarative core or define it as a specific semantic type (e.g., Mastop 2005; Portner 2007; 
Kaufmann 2012). And when one does encounter delineation criteria, as those set out in van 
der Auwera et al. (2005), their theoretical and methodological justification is left implicit.  
In Jary and Kissine (2013) we provide a book-length critical discussion of these, and 
others theories of the imperative. In this paper we would like to formulate more precisely and 
defend the definition of the imperative sentence-type suggested in that book. The imperative, 
we will argue, should be thought of as a comparative concept, in the sense of Haspelmath 
(2010): it is a crosslinguistic construct that can be functionally defined and employed to 
compare different, albeit overlapping, categories across languages.  
On the account we defend, while the imperative is defined in relation to its prototypical 
function, the performance of directive speech acts, it does not reduce to it, as will be argued in 
Section 1. In Section 2, we will show that our point is far from being merely terminological, 
and that absence of clear definition of what should, and what should not, be described as an 
imperative impedes the description, let alone the analysis, of fascinating typological 
differences. In Section 3, we will see that our approach allows one to uncover and explain the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a survey of the history of the notion of mood, see van der Auwera and Aguilar Cordoba (forthcoming). 
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core that is common to all the manifestations of the imperative across different languages; it 
helps clarify the irrealis, or better, potential status of imperatives, and provides an explanation 
for the non-directive occurrence of imperatives in good wishes. 
 
2 THE DIRECTIVE FUNCTION OF IMPERATIVE MOOD 
A functional definition of the imperative mood may seem straightforward enough: imperative 
sentences are what we prototypically use to ask or tell other people to act in a certain way, 
viz. to perform directive speech acts. However, if we are not to cast our net too wide, it is 
crucial to precisely delineate this functional domain, which will subsequently be used to 
define the imperative mood as a crosslinguistic comparative concept. We will begin this 
section by providing a clear definition of directive illocutionary force, that is, of the 
conditions under which an utterance constitutes a directive speech act. Next, we will restrict 
the definition of the imperative in such a way so as to rule out non-imperative forms 
employed to perform indirect speech acts, whether these be conventional or not. 
1.1 Defining directive force 
Commands and orders (4)-(5) are probably the most obvious instances of a directive speech 
act.2 However, it is usually agreed that the category of directive speech acts also includes 
milder requests, suggestions and pleas (6)-(8), warnings and advice (9)-(10), as well as 
prohibition and permission (11)-(12). 
(4) Stand at attention! 
(5) Shut the door. 
(6) Put this parcel here, please. 
(7) Bring some flowers (if you want to please her). 
(8) Don’t hurt him! 
(9) Watch out for pickpockets! 
(10) Read the reviewer’s comments carefully. 
(11) Don’t use my computer in my absence. 
(12) Take my car to go to the movies (but be back by ten). 
Following Searle (1975a), it has been common to think of directives either as attempts 
by the speaker to get the hearer to do something, or as expressions of speaker desire, or as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 While orders and requests are the most prototypical instances of the directive family, this doesn’t mean that 
they are the most common. Politeness considerations may restrict the use of orders and requests, which could go 
some way to explaining why Van Olmen (2011) found that imperative seem to occur less frequently in orders 
and requests than in advice or suggestions. 
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some combination of both. And, according to van der Auwera et al.’s (2005) definition, 
‘imperatives […] have to do with the expression of a wish of the speaker about a future state 
of affairs […] and convey an appeal to the addressee(s) to help make the future state of affairs 
true’. While intuitively appealing, such a view of directive force runs into problems when 
permission and advice are considered, for neither of these can be successfully analysed in 
such terms: when giving permission or advice, the speaker need not be attempting to get the 
hearer to perform the act described, nor need she want him to perform that act (e.g., Wilson 
and Sperber 1988; for an extensive discussion, see Jary and Kissine 2014: 55–65).  
One solution to this problem is to maintain a definition of directive force as an expression 
of the desire and/or the intention that the addressee bring about the truth of the propositional 
content, and to argue that permission and advice do not belong to the class of genuine 
directive speech acts. Taken as a purely terminological decision this option is probably as 
good as any. However, it would force any attempt at a preliminary crosslinguistic 
characterisation of the imperative to start off with the assumption that in most languages the 
imperative should be associated with two distinct prototypical functions: ‘proper’ directive 
speech acts on the one side and advice, warning and permission on the other. From a 
typological point of view, it is not wise to split these two families of uses of imperative 
sentences apart, as the range of uses to which the imperative is put almost always includes 
advice, warnings and permission.  
It is true that one does find in some languages ‘preventives’, specifically dedicated to 
warnings, and ‘permissives’, dedicated to permission (see Golovko 2001 on preventives in 
Aleut; Gruzdeva 2001 on permissives in Nivkh; Alapatov 2001 on permissives in Japanese). 
For reasons just seen, advice, warning and permission do seem somehow peripheral directive 
speech acts, and it is thus not that surprising that some languages should develop highly 
specific preventive and permissive forms for the performance of a sub-set of directives. 
However, it is not always clear that these forms genuinely stand in complementary 
distribution with imperative sentences. In the same vein, even though both permission and 
warnings can often also be cast in the indicative (e.g., You can take the car or You should 
watch out for your wallet), we know of no clear evidence of languages where only the 
indicative, and not the imperative, can be used in permission and warning. To be sure, this 
kind of relatively subtle question about the use of the imperatives is often difficult to answer 
solely on the basis of existing descriptions, and more typological work is needed to confirm 
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this point.3 As things stand today, however, it seems fairly certain that in the vast majority of 
languages these same functions are happily performed with the imperative.4 The existence of 
specific preventive and permissive forms thus doesn’t warrant, in our opinion, definitions of 
directive force that excludes advice and permission. (Or, at the very least, the burden of the 
typological proof stays with those willing to defend such definitions.)  
To make this last point clearer, compare warnings and permission with good wishes cast 
in the imperative. There is significant crosslinguistic variation on how productive this last 
usage is. In English, for example, it shows evidence of being idiomatised: while one can say 
(13), (14) or (15), example (16) is highly deviant as a good wish.  
(13) Have a nice journey back. 
(14) Enjoy the show. 
(15) Get well soon. 
(16) #Win the lottery. 
While some languages (e.g., French and Spanish) exhibit similar preferences to English in 
this respect, some others may show greater productivity. For instance, while Georgian has an 
optative mood, specialised for the expression of third-person wishes (with non-stative verbs), 
for second-person good wishes, the imperative is used instead (Boeder 2010: 626; see also 
Nasilov et al. 2001 for similar indications on Turkik languages).5 By contrast, in Javanese, 
imperative forms occur only in passive, but while such imperative constructions are used in 
requests, commands or invitations, good wishes may be performed only with active irrealis 
verbal forms (Ogloblin 2001). We will return to good wishes below, but for now the point is 
that while the use of imperatives to express good wishes needs to be accounted for, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To give just one example of the complexity involved, consider the case of Tuyuca, which Aikhenvald (2010: 
201) describes as presenting an opposition between imperatives (i) and preventives (apprehensives, in her 
terminology) (ii): (i) wáa-ya 
go-IMP 
‘Go!’ (ii) naa-ri 
fall-PREV 
‘Make sure you don’t fall! You might fall (lest you fall)!’ 
However, in her description Barnes (1979, 92) merely speaks of a form which is ‘usually more appropriate’ than 
the imperative for giving warnings. Furthermore, in Tuyuaca the suffix -ri expresses negation. In negated 
imperatives, -ri is followed by the emphasis and the imperative markers; in serial, dependent clauses, however, it 
can occur in isolation on the verb stem (Barnes 1979; 1994). It is unclear, then, whether (ii) exemplifies a form 
genuinely different from a negated imperative. 
4 According to Gusev’s (2013: 65) estimations, only around 10% of languages have a specific preventive form. 
5 More precisely, in Georgian, it is the aorist form that is used in directives. This, however, does not change 
anything to the point that the form prototypically associated with directive speech acts is also used for good 
wishes, in spite of the existence of a specialised optative mood. 
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remains a peripheral use, often realised instead by irrealis or optative forms. In other words, 
while the preventive and the permissive are forms specialised for the performance of a sub-set 
of directives, good wishes are speech acts that recruit forms that, crosslinguistically, lie at the 
intersection between the imperative and the optative/subjunctive type. 
It thus makes sense to loosen traditional definitions of directive force to make room 
for permission, advice and warning, but not good wishes. Here we will favour the account of 
directives proposed by Kissine (2009; 2013: Ch. 4), according to which directives are 
illocutionary acts that provide the hearer with a (mutually manifest, in the sense of Sperber 
and Wilson 1995) reason to act. According to this definition, in a context C, an utterance u 
constitutes a directive speech act with the content p if, and only if, it is mutually manifest in C 
that u provides the addressee with a reason to bring about the truth of a certain proposition p.  
Three clarifications are in order here. First, the reasons at hand are not ‘explanatory’ 
ones: obviously a directive doesn’t amount to a proposition that can be used to explain why 
the addressee performed or should perform a certain action. Rather, a directive speech act can 
— but need not — lead the addressee to the decision to bring about the truth of its 
propositional content.6 (Accordingly, a directive with a negated content, such as Don’t close 
the door, provides A with a reason for refraining from performing an action.) Second, an 
utterance may provide reasons for a number for different actions, some of which may be even 
unforeseen by the speaker. This is why our definition of directives requires it to be mutually 
manifest to all parties to the conversation that the utterance at hand provides the addressee 
with a reason to act. Third, if the directive is direct, its content is explicitly represented by the 
utterance. We are aware that this way of speaking begs many important issues on the nature 
of propositions and content, and particularly on that of imperative sentences. For the purposes 
of this paper, however, we can content ourselves with the intuitive idea that Open the door 
somehow represents the proposition that the addressee opens the door. 
At this point, it should be clear that a directive may express speaker desire, but this is 
not a necessary condition for an utterance to count as directive.7 The reason constituted by a 
felicitous directive need not be sufficient for acting: a directive speech act can merely be a 
further reason. This brings permission and advice back within the class of directive speech 
acts (but keeps good wishes out of it). Another consequence is that invitations (17) and offers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cf. Grice’s (2001: 37–44) posthumous typology of reasons; see Kissine (2013: 67–71, 104–105) for a 
discussion in relation to illocutionary forces. 
7 Kissine’s analysis of directive force differs from that of Bach and Harnish (1979) in that his is not couched in 
terms of the expression and recognition of the speaker’s intention that her utterance being taken as a reason to 
act. For a critique of Bach and Harnish’s definition, see Davies (1986: 41) and Jary and Kissine (2014: 57–58). 
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(18) can be conceived of as directives (which may explain why they are often cast in the 
imperative): they provide the addressee with a (non-necessarily causally efficient) reason to 
act, which commits the speaker to a certain course of action should this reason turn efficient.  
(17) Pop by this afternoon (if you have time). 
(18) Have a beer (if you wish). 
 At this point, then, we are ready for our first shot at a definition of the imperative as a 
comparative concept:  
IMPERATIVE AS A COMPARATIVE CONCEPT-(ATTEMPT 1): 
A sentence-type whose prototypical illocutionary function is to provide the hearer with a 
reason to act.8 
 
1.2 Indirect speech acts 
Now, of course, the provisional definition just sketched is far too liberal, because many 
directive speech acts are performed with major non-imperative sentence-types: 
(19) Will you close the door? 
(20) You are leaving now. 
These morphosyntactic types, though, are associated with other prototypical functions, such 
as asking questions and making statements. In order to avoid postulating multiple semantic 
ambiguity for such forms, therefore, one has to restrict the definition of the imperative as a 
sentence-type whose only prototypical function is to provide the hearer with a reason to act.  
 However this is still insufficient. Indirect speech acts can famously be 
‘conventionalised’ (Searle 1975b; Morgan 1978; Bach and Harnish 1979; Bach 1998). For 
instance, constructions such as the Can you_ ? construction in (21) are so highly 
conventionalised that authors such as Stefanowitsch (2003) argue that they bear direct 
association with directive illocutionary force: 
(21) Can you close the door? 
Such a rationale requires identifying those formal properties of the construction at hand that 
would put it apart from both imperatives and interrogatives. Like Sadock (1974), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The restriction to illocutionary functions is necessary because very often the imperative has also the 
prototypical function of denoting an action of the addressee (see Section 3.2). 
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Stefanowitsch (2003) invokes explicit markers of directive force, which, he argues, can occur 
sentence-internally only in interrogatives used as indirect requests: 9 
(22) Can you please close the door? 
Of course, if this criterion is to be used as the ultimate diagnostic of the conventionalisation of 
some indirect request, then, as shown by the following example from Davies (1986: 21), one 
runs the risk of an excessive multiplication of ‘indirect request constructions’: 
(23) I’d appreciate it if you would please be quite. 
That said, it remains indisputable that some indirect requests are indeed constituted by deeply 
conventionalised constructions. According to our provisional definition of the imperative, 
they should all be considered as imperative sentence-types on their own right — as sentence-
types whose only prototypical function is to perform directive speech acts. Of course, one 
may bite the terminological bullet and agree that the imperative may, in some languages, 
cover two very different morphosyntactic templates. But apart from being descriptively 
inelegant, this option obfuscates many interesting empirical questions relative to potential 
processing differences between conventional indirect speech acts and imperatives 
(Ruytenbeek forthcoming), or to diachronic patterns of change, leading from indirect 
conventional requests forms to bona fide imperatives (Mauri and Sansò 2011). We need, 
therefore, to identify principled ground for excluding forms used in conventionally indirect 
directives from our definition of imperatives.  
An important point about constructions such as Can you_? is that, despite their 
conventionality, they can only be used for a limited range of directives. While one can use 
(21) to perform a request, a command or a supplication, this example can hardly be read as a 
piece of advice or an act of granting permission – unlike the imperative in (24). 
(24) Close the door. 
This suggests that our definition of the imperative should make reference to the fact that this 
form, unlike others, can be used to perform the full range of directive speech acts. In this way, 
the following definition of the imperative excludes (conventionally) indirect directives: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Sadock’s (1974: 97–109) early generative view was the that conventionalised indirect requests and bona fide 
imperative share a common ‘imperative’ deep structure (for critical discussions, see Bach and Harnish 1979: 
200–202; Levinson 1983: 266; Davies 1986: 21; Jary and Kissine 2014: 16–19) 
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IMPERATIVE AS A COMPARATIVE CONCEPT-(ATTEMPT 2): 
A sentence-type whose only prototypical illocutionary function is to provide the addressee(s) 
with a reason to act and that is suitable for the performance of the full range of directive 
speech acts. 
 Now, the restriction to the full range of directive helps rule out conventionalised 
indirect speech acts only if questions are not included within the class of directives. It is true 
that taxonomies such as Searle and Vanderveken (1985) or Bach and Harnish (1979) conceive 
of questions as a sub-set of directives: as requests for information, which specifically call for 
a verbal response. This is very counter-intuitive from a linguistic point of view: while, as will 
be discussed below, there exist languages with no specific imperative sentence-type, to the 
best of our knowledge, no language exhibits a full morphosyntactic overlap between 
interrogatives and imperatives (e.g., Siemund 2001). In addition, Gusev (2013 : 29, 104–7) 
adduces fascinating typological evidence showing that intonation-wise, imperatives and 
declaratives pattern together versus interrogatives. Proposals for what interrogative semantics 
expresses vary from partitioned sets of propositions (answers) to incomplete propositions 
(e.g., Groenendijk and Stokhof 1989; Fiengo 2007), but, again, one never finds an overlap 
with what has been suggested as the semantics of imperatives. Of course, this kind of 
response from our part may seem circular, as it takes for granted an existing delineation of 
sentence-types. However, even when considered solely as kinds of speech actions, directives 
and questions are also conceptually very different. An appropriate response to a question has 
to belong to the assertion family: responding to a question commits one either to some answer 
or to ignorance.10 Directives, by contrast, are responded to either by signalling compliance or 
by a refusal to comply. On this account, Tell me your name is a directive because one can 
respond No, whereas What’s your name? is a question  because it requires an answer.11  
2 WHY DOES IT MATTER? 
At this stage, some readers might dismiss our definition as trivial. Aren’t we just providing a 
redundant description of forms that appear in direct directive speech acts? What is the benefit 
of such a definition for the linguist? In this section, we hope to persuade the sceptical reader 
that, for accurate crosslinguistic description, it is crucial to be clear about what is meant by 
‘imperative’. We will begin by arguing that something like our definition of the imperative is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 One may even go as far as claiming that directives can be conceptualised independently of assertion (with 
some caveats), but questions can’t (cf. Levinson, 2012). 
11 Granted, one can also refuse to answer a question, but this is to opt out of the ‘language game’ initiated by the 
questioner. 
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required in order to compare imperative flexional paradigms across languages in a fruitful 
manner. This will bring us to the delicate issue of languages that seem to have no imperative 
at all. We will argue that our definition of the imperative allows one to carefully distinguish 
between markers (of a certain sub-type) of directive force and grammaticalized markers of the 
imperative mood.  
2.1 Distinctions in flexional paradigms 
It is well-known that morphological imperative paradigms may extend to third, first plural 
and, more rarely, to the first-person singular (van der Auwera, Dobrushina, and Goussev 
2005; Aikhenvald 2010: 76). To quote one particularly striking case, in Nivkh (an isolate 
spoken around the low reaches of Amur river and on Sakhalin Island) verbs display no person 
agreement in declarative sentences; in the imperative, however, agreement is compulsory for 
all the persons, making the case for a full imperative paradigm very persuasive (Gruzdeva 
2001). In such a case, the addressee of a directive speech act (viz. the person for whom the 
utterance is a reason to act) need not coincide with the addressee of the utterance. 
Now, deciding how extensive a given imperative paradigm is presupposes that one has 
an operational crosslinguistic definition of the imperative mood. Let us illustrate this with a 
consideration of what is sometimes dubbed the ‘subjunctive strategy’, viz. the widespread 
tendency to use subjunctive forms to fill the missing cells of imperative paradigms and/or to 
perform directive speech acts (cf. van der Auwera and Lejeune 2005).  
Armenian has morphological imperative second-person singular and plural forms, 
marked by dedicated suffixation of infinitive or aorist stems. However, when the requested 
action is to be performed by a group including the speaker, Armenian makes recourse to the 
first-person plural (present) subjunctive form. Note that this not the only use to which first-
person subjunctive can be put in matrix clauses: it can also be used for expressing wishes or 
describing an action that will be performed immediately after the utterance time (Kozintseva 
2001; Dum-Tragut 2009 : 239–240).  
One common descriptive strategy is simply calling any form dedicated to non-second-
person directives ‘hortative’ or ‘jussive’ (van der Auwera et al. 2005) or ‘non-canonical 
imperative’ (Aikhenvald 2010). However, such uniform labels occlude important 
crosslinguistic differences. Like Armenian, French has a dedicated second-person (singular 
and plural) imperative, marked by the bare use of the indicative or subjunctive form. Apart 
from the compulsory absence of an overt subject, a crucial difference between imperatives on 
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the one hand, and indicatives and subjunctives on the other, is that while clitics precede the 
verb in indicative and subjunctive constructions, they come after the imperative forms: 
(25) Que tu  le sois… 
that you-SG it=be-SBJV.PR.2SG 
‘That you be it…’  
(26) Sois-le 
be-IMPV.2SG=it 
‘Be it.’ 
The important point here is that, in contrast to Armenian, prototypical first-person plural 
directive speech acts are, in French, formally similar to the second-person imperatives. Unlike 
the subjunctive or indicative constructions, imperative forms are characterised by the 
obligatory omission of the syntactic subject, and by post-verbal clitic position.  
(27) Que nous le soyons… 
that we it=be-SBJV.PR.1PL… 
‘That we be this…’ 
(28) Nous le faisons. 
 we it=do-IND.PR.1PL 
‘We do it’ 
(29) Soyons-le. 
be-IMPV.1PL=it 
‘Let’s be it.’ 
(30) Faisons-le. 
do-IMPV.1PL=it 
‘Let’s do it.’ 
That first-person forms in (29)-(30) really belong to the imperative paradigm is confirmed by 
the fact that they are unacceptable with a (non-vocative) syntactic subject and with proclitics. 
(31) *Nous faisons-le. 
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  we do-IMPV.1PL=it 
(32) *Le faisons. 
  it=do-IMPV.1PL 
There is, then, an essential and interesting typological difference between Armenian and 
French that would be lost were both languages simply said to have a hortative or ‘non-
canonical’ imperative form. By contrast, given our definition of the imperative mood, it 
follows that French has first-person-plural imperative, while in Armenian there is no 
dedicated imperative form, the missing slots of the imperative paradigm being filled by the 
subjunctive. (Otherwise, one should admit either that some subjunctive forms are also 
imperative, muddling the definition of forms, or that some subjunctive forms may be used 
with an imperative function, thereby confusing imperative sentence-type with directive force.) 
 In addition, we would like to urge an even subtler distinction between non-second-
person imperatives and horatives/jussives, which builds on van der Auwera et al.’s (2005) 
distinction between minimal and maximal imperative-hortative systems. To this end, let us 
briefly recall some well-known facts about English let us constructions. Intuitively, (33), as 
uttered, for instance, by the captain to his football team, is a directive speech act, addressed at 
a group that includes the speaker. 
(33) Let us play a fair game tonight (mates). 
It makes little sense to interpret (33) as a second-person imperative with the verb let, that is, 
as being equivalent to (34). 
(34) Allow us to play a fair game tonight. 
Furthermore, the let us construction used as a form dedicated to the performance of first-
person-plural directive speech acts has salient structural properties. Unlike the second-person 
imperative with let, it allows first-person tags (35), the contraction of us (36) and internal 
negation (37) (see Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 935; Jary and Kissine 2014: 35–41): 
(35) a. Let us see what you bought, will you? / *Let us see what you bought, shall we? 
= ‘Allow us to see what you bought’ 
b. *Let us play a fair game tonight, will you? / Let us play a fair game tonight, 
shall we 
≠ ‘Allow us to play a fair game tonight’ 
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(36) a. Let us see what you bought  
= ‘Allow us to see what you bought’ 
b. Let’s see what you bought  
≠ ‘Allow us to see what you bought’ 
(37) a. Don’t let us leave now  
= ‘Don’t allow us to leave now’ 
= ‘Don’t let’s leave now 
b. Let’s not leave  
≠ ‘Don’t allow us to leave now’ 
= ‘Don’t let’s leave now’ 
It is then fair to say that English has a form dedicated for the performance of first-person 
directives. However this specific form is very different from the second-person imperative; in 
that respect, English differs from, for instance, French, whose first-person plural imperative 
clearly forms a homogenous paradigm with second-person imperatives.  
From a typological point of view, it is important to capture the differences between 
languages that have no specific form for the performance of ‘non-second person’ directives, 
addressed at someone else than the utterance addressee(s) (e.g., Armenian), those where the 
imperative paradigm include non-second person imperative forms (e.g., French) and those 
that do display specific forms dedicated to the performance of non-second person directive 
but where these forms differ from second person imperatives (e.g., English). To this end, we 
suggest that the term imperative be reserved for forms homogenous with the second-person 
imperative. (We assume here something like Aikhenvald’s (2010: 76) implicational scale, 
according to which the existence of non-second-person singular imperative forms in a 
language obligatory implies that this language also a has second-person singular imperative 
form.) 
IMPERATIVE AS A COMPARATIVE CONCEPT-(FINAL): 
A sentence-type whose only prototypical illocutionary function is to provide the addressee(s) 
with a reason to act, that is suitable for the performance of the full range of directive speech 
acts, and whose manifestations are all morphologically and syntactically homogenous with 
the second person.  
Terms like hortative should then be reserved for forms that are not morphologically and 
syntactically homogenous with the second-person imperative but that otherwise fall under our 
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definition of the imperative, like the English let us construction. According to our 
terminology, then, French has a first-person plural imperative, English has a first-person 
plural hortative and Armenian has no dedicated form for first-person plural directive speech 
acts. 
2.2 Languages without an imperative 
Without any doubt, the functional category of directive speech acts is instantiated by speakers 
of every language. However, our definition of the imperative as a comparative concept leaves 
open the possibility that certain languages are ‘imperativeless’: these are languages that lack 
altogether forms whose sole prototypical function is to provide the addressee(s) with a reason 
to act. We will argue now that far from being an undesirable consequence of our definition, it 
in fact affords a clearer view on the distinction between imperative forms and directive 
functions. 
It is perhaps timely to expand a little on what should be meant by form here. Clearly, 
the imperative cannot restricted to verbal moods, because that would deprive, in a rather 
uninteresting sense, all morphologically poor (or fully isolating) languages from this 
descriptive category. Rather, the imperative should be thought a sentence-type, in Sadock and 
Zwicky’s (1985) classic sense of a unique mapping between a function and a set of 
morphosyntactic properties. For instance, in the Amazonian language Canela-Krahô neither 
tense nor the imperative mood are morphologically marked, but the omission of the syntactic 
subject is prototypically associated with, and can only occur with, directive force. Thus while 
the translation of (38) is ‘You cut/are cutting the wood’, (38) can only be glossed as ‘Kill the 
deer’ (Popjes and Popjes 1986). 
(38) ca  pĩ jitep 
2SG wood cut 
(39) po cura 
deer  kill 
Therefore, even though Canela-Krahô has no imperative morphology proper, the fact that it 
has a distinct form devoted to directive speech acts warrants the claim that there exists a 
sentential imperative mood in this language. The same point applies to languages that use 
another verbal mood in directives. In Hungarian, the imperative affix -j is formally 
indistinguishable from the subjunctive form (Kenesei et al. 1998). However, since this 
‘subjunctive’ form is only used matrix clauses for the second person with a directive function, 
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Hungarian can be said to have an imperative sentence-type after all;12 the same applies to 
Hausa (cf. Dobronravin and Smirnova 2001).  
Iberian Spanish provides an interesting case for comparison. Here we find two imperative 
paradigms, neither of which contains a third-person form. Functionally, the paradigms are 
distinguished in terms of formality, and each contains both a singular and a plural second-
person form.  
(40) Hazlo 
do-IMPV.2SG=it (informal) 
(41) Hacedlo 
do-IMPV.2PL=it (informal) 
(42) Hágalo 
do-IMPV.2SG=it (formal) 
(43) Háganlo 
do-IMPV.2PL=it (formal) 
There is also a first-person plural form that patterns like a formal form (in that the verb is 
morphologically identical with the subjunctive) but has no formal connotations, and is best 
seen as neutral in terms of formality: 
(44) Hagámoslo 
do-IMPV.1PL=it  
While the formal imperatives have the same morphological verb form as the subjunctive, 
the verb-final cliticisation patterns that they display are found only in imperatives. When a 
subjunctive is used to perform a directive, by contrast, it must be preceded by the 
complementizer que and clitics precede the verb: 
(45) Que  lo hagas 
that  it=do-SBJV.2SG 
Third-person directives must be performed using the subjunctive construction: 
(46) Que  lo haga 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In fact, an imperative paradigm that extends to all persons according to our criteria (cf. de Groot 2014). 
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that  it=do-SBJV.3SG 
The second-person subjunctive in Spanish differs from that of Hungarian in that the Spanish 
construction has non-directive uses: it can be used to express good wishes, for example, in a 
much more productive way than the imperative can. Furthermore, the subjunctive form is 
often be used to report the desires of a third-person. This range of uses means that a case such 
as (45) does not count as an imperative on our account. 
German exhibits a similar pattern to Spanish in that the verb in the polite second-person 
imperative has subjunctive morphology (47), as does the verb in the first-person plural (48). 
As in Spanish, however, these sentence types should count as imperative because they the 
exhibit the word-order features of second-person informal imperatives, both singular and 
plural: any overt subject occurs after the verb (49). This is in contrast to (somewhat archaic) 
directive uses of the subjunctive in instructions, for example, where the subject precedes the 
verb (50). Thus the definition proposed in this paper provides principled grounds for 
distinguishing sentence types as imperative even if the verbal mood is aptly described as 
subjunctive.13  
(47) Gehen   Sie   schon   mal  vor 
go-SUBJ.3PL  you  already time ahead 
(48) Gehen   wir   schon   mal  vor 
go-SUBJ.3PL  we  already time ahead 
(49) Geh    Du   schon   mal  vor 
go-IMP.2SG  you  already time ahead 
(50) Man  nehme    nach  jeder  Mahlzeit  eine  Tablette 
One take-SUBJ.3SG after each meal  one tablet 
Acknowledging that there are languages that recruit morphological markings used in 
other functions to build up imperative sentence-types allows interesting comparisons with 
languages that simply use the same form for several functions including the directive one.14 
One famous example of the latter kind is the Australisian language Nunggubuyu where 
directives and assertions about are indistinguishable out of context. That is, the following 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Thanks to Eva Eppler for help with this German data, and for pointing out that the verb form in (47) and (48) 
might be labelled otherwise (e.g., infinitive) due to syncretism.  
14 In order, for instance, to trace successive steps in diachronic paths of grammaticalization (cf. Mauri and Sansò 
2011) 
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example can be translated either as the assertion ‘You sit down’ or the order ‘Sit down’ 
(Heath 1984; Verstraete 2005). 
(51) ba=buraː-v́ 
2SG.IRR=sit-NON-PAST 
Likewise, Mauri and Sansò (2011) discuss Önge, where assertions about the future and 
directives are formally indistinguishable and Laz, where the same form is ambiguous between 
past perfective and directive interpretations. While there is much to say about the functional 
reasons that render this or that form suitable for being used in directives (Birjulin and 
Xrakovski 2001; Aikhenvald 2010: 38–47; Mauri and Sansò 2011), our point here is that such 
theorising (implicitly) presupposes a distinction between languages with and without 
imperative. Compare our view with Birjulin & Xrakovski’s, for whom verbal forms that 
belong to the imperative paradigm: ‘(a) must be regularly built from lexemes whose 
semantics admits the formation of imperative verb forms, and (b) must be recognizable within 
the sentence as units with imperative meaning’ (2001, 9). This definition entails that both 
Hungarian subjunctives and Nunggubuyu irrealis non-past should count as imperatives. Our 
definition, by contrast, makes it clear that Hungarian has a dedicated imperative sentence-
type, while Nunggubuyu does not. 
 As an interesting application of the idea that some languages are devoid of an 
imperative sentential type altogether, consider Vietnamese. Vietnamese is an isolating 
language and imperative mood is sometimes said to be marked by particles such as đi, ‘to go’ 
(Bystrov and Stankevič 2001). 
(52) họ nữa đi  
study further 
Now, it is a well-known tendency in languages of the world to grammaticalise second-person 
forms of the verb go as imperative markers (Aikhenvald 2010; Mauri and Sansò 2011). 
However, according to Bystrov and Stankevič (2001: 466) in Vientamese the đi particle 
occurs only in informal speech; in other contexts a directive speech act can be structurally 
indistinguishable from an assertion (Đình-Hoà 1997: 158–159). For instance, (53) can be 
glossed as ‘You will carry this bag’, ‘You carried this bag’ or ‘Carry this bag’. 
(53) anh xách cái túi này 
you carry CLASS bag this 
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Because it cannot cover the full range of directive speech acts, the particle đi does not qualify 
as a full-fledged imperative marker. It plays the same role as, say, the collocation vas-y (‘go 
ahead’…), in informal French: it emphasises that the utterance is a command or a request, but 
by no means is it a compulsory element of prototypical directive speech acts. 
(54) vas-y   donne-moi  le pain 
go.IMP.2SG=there give.IMP.2SG=me the bread 
‘Come on, give me the bread!’ 
One may speculate that Vietnamese is at an intermediate diachronic stage where markers of 
the illocutionary force start to be used in a systematic fashion, but are not yet fully 
grammaticalised. Such speculation, however, is possible only if one can happily live with the 
idea that, as yet, there is no imperative in Vietnamese.15 
 3 WHAT ARE THE PROPERTIES OF IMPERATIVES? 
By definition, a comparative concept may cover different linguistic realities — 
different descriptive concepts — from language to language. However, there must be a 
semantic-pragmatic core to this concept, determined by its functional value. For instance, Van 
de Velde (2009) argues convincingly that while proper name, qua a comparative concept, 
entails direct reference (in the sense of Kripke 1980) to a (salient) entity, other properties, 
such as specific of patterns of agreement, or of co-occurrence with determiners, are language 
specific. We have defined the imperative, qua a comparative concept, as a form whose sole 
prototypical use is the performance of the full range of directive speech acts. The question we 
would like to address in this section is: Which features make a form specifically suited for 
this prototypical function? We will begin by arguing that imperatives are inherently potential. 
Next, we consider the point that, when used with their prototypical illocutionary function, 
imperatives denote dynamic situations; we will show, however, that there is evidence that this 
constraint is not an inherent semantic feature of the imperative sentence type qua 
crosslinguistic category, as there is evidence of variation across languages. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The existence of languages without a specific imperative sentence-type poses a great challenge to theories that 
link, in one way or another, imperative mood with directive force, and are therefore compelled to argue that non-
imperative directive speech acts are indirect (Kissine 2012; Kissine 2013: 112–118; see Jary and Kissine 2014: 
72–76 for an in-depth discussion of such theories). 
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3.1 Potentiality 
Imperative forms are often said to stand on the irrealis side of the realis/irrealis divide. For 
example, in a highly influential proposal Han (2000) assigns to the imperative [+irrealis] and 
[+directive] features. The first empirical complication for such claims is that there are 
languages that combine imperatives with realis markers (e.g., Aikhenvald 2010: 81; Mauri 
and Sansò 2012). Furthermore, while irrealis forms are often used to supply inexistent 
imperative forms (Nunggubuyu and Hungarian, discussed above are a case in point), there are 
also languages that recruit realis forms (as, for instance, Rapanui, which uses realis future 
marking; see Du Feu 1996: 36–38). The situation is further complicated by the fact that the 
reality covered by term ‘irrealis’ is largely inconsistent across different linguistic descriptions 
(Bybee et al. 1994: 236–240; Elliott 2000; De Haan 2011). We will now argue that the core 
meaning of imperatives as denoting non-actual states of affairs is better explained in terms of 
a potentiality constraint. 
The fact that a form has a prototypical function does not preclude it from being used for 
some other function. For example, the declarative mood plausibly has the prototypical 
function of making statements, but it can also be used to issue directives. As has been noted 
by Recanati (1987: 163–169), sentences (55) and (56) could be uttered either as statements of 
fact or, under the right circumstances, as commands.16  
(55) Tonight I will sleep in a four-poster bed. 
(56) You will clean the latrines. 
What is notable about the imperative, by contrast, is that, at least in independent-clause 
uses, it is restricted to its prototypical function of issuing directives (we ignore, for the 
moment, the case of good wishes). Most crucially, the imperative cannot be used to assert the 
utterance’s literal content. 
The clearest indication of the fact that imperatives are not suited for the performance of 
assertion—nor, for that matter, of any speech act of the ‘assertive’ family—is that they cannot 
be judged true or false.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 There is good reason to hold that, when uttered as directives, (55) and (56) are not indirect speech acts (see 
Introduction). The speaker is not making a claim and thereby ordering: he is simply ordering. This point is 
supported by the fact that there is no response to either utterance that both accepts it as an order and treats it as 
an assertion: responding to either with ‘That’s true’ or ‘I agree’, for example, amounts to failing to recognise the 
directive intent behind the utterance.  
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(57) S: Clean the latrines. — A: #Yes, that’s true, I will. 
(58) S: Clean the latrines. — A: #No, that’s not true/ that’s false, I will never do such a 
thing. 
The imperative’s lack of assertoric force potential presents a particular problem for accounts 
such as Kaufmann (2012), which try to reduce the imperative to a declarative: complex—and 
ultimately problematic—presuppositional mechanisms must be postulated in order to account 
for the fact that imperatives cannot be felicitously judged true or false (for a detailed 
discussion of Kaufmann’s theory and her attempt to explain away the imperative’s resistance 
to truth-judgments, see Jary and Kissine 2014: 225-246; Jary and Kissine in press).  
 But while imperatives cannot be used to make truth-claims, their prototypical function 
entails that their use is constrained by what is taken to be true at the time of utterance. A 
felicitous directive is one which can be complied with. This entails that the propositional 
content of the directive must be neither true at the time of utterance, nor ruled out by what is 
taken to be common ground at the time of utterance. Thus it is infelicitous both to order a 
seated person to sit down and to order a completely bald man to comb his hair. In other 
words, for a directive to be felicitous, the propositional content expressed by the utterance 
must be potential, where this is understood as being neither part of, nor ruled out by, the 
common ground.17  
 The question this raises in relation to current concerns is whether potentiality should 
be seen as a consequence of the prototypical illocutionary function of the imperative or as a 
semantic feature of the imperative sentence type (understood as a crosslinguistic typological 
category) that makes it apt for this function. This question can be answered by considering, 
first, whether there are any non-directive uses of the imperative, and then, if there are, 
whether these are also subject to the potentiality constraint. If we find uses meeting both 
conditions, then we have a strong case for holding that potentiality is a semantic feature of the 
imperative sentence type that specifies it for directive illocutionary acts.  
 We already find some support for the view that potentiality is a semantic feature of 
imperative sentences from the above-mentioned observation that they cannot be used to assert 
the literal content of the utterance. Further support comes from certain non-directive uses that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The notion of potentiality has been employed by other authors in the analysis of imperatives, most notably 
Davies (1986: 48) and Wilson and Sperber (1988). Our account differs from Davies’s in that we specify 
potentiality in relation to the common ground. As regards Wilson and Sperber’s proposal, the way the notion of 
potentiality is presented incorrectly allows for the possibility of using imperatives with assertoric force (for a 
detailed discussion, see Jary 2011: 270). 
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imperatives can have in some languages. The most prominent examples here are independent-
clause imperatives found in good wishes we mentioned earlier. Other uses of imperatives that 
might be described as non-directive are audienceless cases such as (59). 
(59) Please be out. [spoken by a child sent to apologise to neighbours] 
(Wilson and Sperber 1988)  
Note that both good wishes and audienceless cases retain the potentiality constraint. It would 
be infelicitous to use (60), say to express one’s regret that the hearer had a very bad outward 
journey, or to use (59) if it is clear to the speaker that the neighbours are at home. 
(60) Have a nice journey back.     [= (13)] 
And while one might utter (61) if one’s partner came back car-less with a sorry look, the same 
utterance would be infelicitous in front of the wrecked car (unless the speaker is taken to 
convey that she can’t believe what’s in front of her eyes).  
(61) Oh no! Don’t have crashed the car again! 
Therefore, we hold that potentiality is a semantic feature of imperatives, independent of 
their illocutionary force. Furthermore, the fact that in audienceless cases like (59) are subject 
to the potentiality constraint suggests that potentiality should not be defined relative only to 
the conversational background, but relative to some relevant body of information (which will 
most often be the conversational background). In this connection, Dominicy and Franken 
(2002) observe that the following imperative may be uttered by an archaeologist, who is about 
to unwrap a mummy, and for whose theory the date of birth of the mummified king is crucial. 
(62) Please, be born before 4000 BC! 
The reason (62) is felicitous is that, as far as the relevant background is concerned (the 
information the archaeologist and his audience have at the utterance time), it is unknown 
whether or not the mummified king was born before 4000 BC (even though, it is, of course, 
objectively settled). This why the same utterance would be infelicitous once the mummy has 
been properly dated. 
 Further support for the view that potentiality is a semantic feature of imperative 
sentences can be found in the analysis of their non-main clause uses.18 Examination of such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Note that because our definition makes reference to illocutionary functions, it does not preclude imperative 
forms from occurring in non-main clause positions without directive force. This allows us to stay comfortably 
away from the debate on the (non)-embeddability of imperatives (for claims that imperative don’t embed, see, 
for instance, Han 2000: 119–121 and Maier 2010; for an opposite opinion, see Crnič and Trinh, 2009, Kaufmann 
2012: 199–204 and Zanuttini, Pak, and Portner 2012; for a discussion, see Jary and Kissine 2014: 104–108) 
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cases suggests that the potentiality constraint is still in place, albeit relaxed so that the 
proposition expressed does not have to be potential relative to the conversational background, 
as is the case in independent-clause uses, but may instead be potential given a contextual 
salient set of assumptions. 
 One non-main-clause use are ‘conditional-like imperative’ constructions such as the 
following.  
(63) Make any trouble and you got the sack. 
(64) Take a holiday in those days and you were considered a spendthrift.  
(65) Turn up yesterday and you’d have got a real shock. 
(Davies 1986: 165) 
In these cases, it can be claimed that the proposition expressed by the imperative clause is 
potential in relation to some historic information state. It may also be that such uses derive 
from similar constructions, where the state of affairs described by the imperative is clearly a 
potential one: 
(66) Win the lottery and you won’t have to work for the rest of your days. 
A number of authors (e.g., Clark, 1993, Han, 2000, Russell, 2007) have disputed the claim 
that some or all ‘conditional-like imperative’ constructions contain imperatives, spurred on by 
the fact that verbal forms in English imperatives are not morphologically marked as such, thus 
opening the possibility that what appear to be imperatives are, say, infinitives. We side with 
Davies (1986, see also Iatridou, 2009, von Fintel and Iatridou, 2012) in holding that the first 
clause in these examples is an imperative, regardless of whether directive force is conveyed or 
not, and have argued for this position in detail in Jary and Kissine (2013: 114-147). Here, it 
suffices to say that there are other languages where morphologically unambiguous 
imperatives have counterfactual meanings in conditional construction, as in the following 
Russian example:19 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19Note that the Russian second-person-singular imperative form may combine, in such an environment, with 
subjects of any persons, which may suggest an on-going semantic change. 
(i) Pishi   (by)  uchenik, 
wirte-IMP.2SG  (COND) pupil 
unchitel’ ne delal by 
teacher NEG do.PAST.3SG COND 
emu  zamechanij. 
to.him  remarks 
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(67) Pridi   ti vchera,  vse 
come-IMP.2SG you yesterday all 
bilo   by  horocho. 
 be-PAST.NEUT.SG COND  all-right 
‘If you had come yesterday, all would have been all right.” 
(Aikhenvald 2010: 237) 
3.2 Agentive interpretation 
In the previous section we argued that the defining the imperative as having the prototypical 
function of performing directive speech acts implied that imperatives would be apt for 
describing potential states of affairs. We then considered whether there were grounds for 
holding that potentiality is a semantic feature of imperative sentences, and found that there 
were was indeed reason to think so. The prototypical directive function of imperatives also 
suggests a close affinity with agency, for directives give the hearer reason to act. We might 
therefore ask the same question in relation to agency: is agency an encoded feature of 
imperatives that makes these apt for directive use, or does the prototypical function of 
imperatives merely lead to a close association between agency and the imperative? 
 At first blush, it might seem that we have strong grounds for holding that agency is 
a semantic feature of the imperative sentence type. When a stative verb is used in an 
imperative, the interpretation is generally coerced into a dynamic, agentive reading. 
Consequently, (68) is interpreted as meaning something like (69). Furthermore, (70) is 
infelicitous because, although an event predicate, winning a lottery is not under the 
addressee’s control. 
(68) Know the answer. 
(69) Make sure you know the answer. 
(70) #Win the lottery. 
Should we claim, therefore, that agency is a semantic feature of imperative sentences, rather 
than a consequence of their prototypical directive function? In contrast with the case of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘If the pupil had been writing, the teacher would not be making remarks to him.’ 
from Aikhenvald 2010, 237 
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potentiality, there are reasons to think not. First, the agency restriction does not apply to non-
independent-clause imperatives — as evidenced by the contrast between (70) and (71).20 
(71) Win the lottery and you’ll never have to work again 
Second, the fact that imperatives can be used to express good wishes (albeit with varying 
degrees of productivity across languages) argues against positing agency as a semantic feature 
of the imperative sentence type. Now, some scholars, such as Han (2000: 169), have 
attempted to explain imperative good wishes away as indirect speech acts, viz. as indirect uses 
of the imperative, which otherwise is dedicated to the directive force. But this will not do. A 
crucial property of indirect speech acts is that the direct speech act can at least be recovered. 
While (72) is an indirect way to ask the addressee to provide Mary’s phone number, the 
primary, direct question about his memory is still available. This is demonstrated by the 
pragmatic acceptability of the addressee’s answering the question and complying with the 
request at the same time (compare with (73)). 
(72) S:  Can you remember Mary’s phone number? 
 A: Yes, I can. It is 34464646464. 
(73) S: Tell me Mary’s phone number! 
 A: # Yes, I can/ I will. 
However, it is impossible to come up with an interpretation for, say, (60) where it counts both 
as a directive and a good wish.  
(60)  Have a nice journey back. [repeated] 
A prerequisite for the directive interpretation of an utterance is that the addressee has control 
over the actualization of its content. However strained, one can imagine a context where it 
actually depends on the addressee of (60) whether he will have a nice journey back — say he 
will not bother his fellow travellers on the train. But the point is that as soon as one comes up 
with such a context and reads (60) as a request, the good wish reading is blocked. It thus 
seems fair to conclude that good wishes, in some languages at least (see Section 1), are 
genuinely direct and proper uses of imperative sentences.  
 We cannot, therefore, make the strong claim that agency is a semantic feature of the 
imperative sentence type, understood as a crosslinguistic typological category. Nevertheless, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Recall that in English the felicity of (70) cannot be restored by interpreting it as a good wish. 
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given the variations in the productivity of this use across languages, a reasonable conjecture is 
that languages may differ in how strong the constraint on the kind of situation denoted by the 
imperative is. In languages where imperatives may be used in good wishes, this constraint 
seems weaker. But because the felicity of good wishes relies on potentiality just as much as 
the felicity of directives, imperatives are ideal candidates for this function, as long as they can 
be relieved of the agency constraint. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have urged a clear-cut definition of morphosyntactic patterns that should be 
termed, across different linguistic descriptions, as belonging to the imperative sentence-type. 
The imperative, as a comparative concept, is a sentence-type whose only prototypical 
illocutionary function is the performance of directive speech acts, and which is suitable for 
the performance of the full range of directives. We also proposed that the imperative should 
be reserved only for forms that are homogenous with the second-person imperative: specific 
sentence types used for the performance of non-second-person singular directives should be 
called hortatives. We hope to have convinced the reader that our argument is not 
terminological nagging; without careful categorical delineation, important crosslinguistic 
differences between imperative paradigms would be blurred.  
 As far as the semantics of this sentence type goes, we have argued that potentiality is 
the only feature that is likely to be universal. Agency, though closely related to the 
illocutionary function of the imperative, is likely to be a semantic feature of some, though not 
all, instantiations of this sentence type.  
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